TimCook 
 
One of the arguments the Justice Department has deployed in its bid to force Apple to bypass security protections on the iPhone is that there’s no precedent being set in the case. In a blog post to the website Lawfare, James Comey, director of the FBI, wrote: “The San Bernardino litigation isn’t about trying to set a precedent or send any kind of message. It is about the victims and justice.”

I have no doubt that Director Comey and other FBI agents sincerely believe that breaking into this particular iPhone is a matter of justice. The FBI’s claims that this isn’t about precedent, however, fall flat when you consider that the organization has submitted 12 additional claims under the All Writs Act that would force Apple to unlock other devices in various cases that have absolutely nothing to do with terrorism.

Apple-Cases

The list of cases runs the gamut, from devices running iOS 4.2.1, to hardware with iOS 9.1. All of these cases involve the All Writs Act, but none of the details have been made public yet. It’s been reported that Apple asked to have the San Bernardino battle sealed as well, but that the DOJ moved to make it public.

The power of precedent

The FBI’s claim that it isn’t trying to set precedent for using the All Writs Act to compel Apple to unlock devices falls apart when you consider the number of times the organization has already asked Apple to unlock its hardware in cases that have absolutely nothing to do with terrorism. The government agency has played up its role in fighting terrorism and dismissed Apple’s attempts to secure its own hardware as nothing more than a marketing strategy, as though consumer and corporate concerns on this front were meaningless. In the aftermath of the Snowden leaks, we know this isn’t true — the NSA (which shares data with the FBI) tapped Google’s international data center linkages as part of a deliberate effort to gain covert access to the company, even though it already had the legal authority to force Google to turn over data on any user it could name.

Some have argued that requiring Apple to bypass its own security standards is analogous to requiring the company to open a safe. But the security implications of forcing a company to hack its own devices go beyond unlocking a single physical device. It’s easy to see why the FBI chose to go public with a test case involving a horrific attack on innocent people, but the 12 other cases floating in the ether put the lie to the idea that this is a one-time or unusual affair.

The All Writs Act that’s being used to compel Apple’s cooperation is not a precisely worded statute that purports to protect device security or lays out the exact circumstances in which companies can be required to break their own device security to aid law enforcement. If concrete law existed on this topic in the first place, the FBI wouldn’t be relying on a 1789 statute to force Apple to comply.
Security expert Bruce Schneier writes:
[T]he hacked software the court and the FBI wants Apple to provide would be general. It would work on any phone of the same model. It has to.
Make no mistake; this is what a backdoor looks like. This is an existing vulnerability in iPhone security that could be exploited by anyone…
What the FBI wants to do would make us less secure, even though it’s in the name of keeping us safe from harm. Powerful governments, democratic and totalitarian alike, want access to user data for both law enforcement and social control. We cannot build a backdoor that only works for a particular type of government, or only in the presence of a particular court order.
Either everyone gets security or no one does. Either everyone gets access or no one does. The current case is about a single iPhone 5c, but the precedent it sets will apply to all smartphones, computers, cars and everything the Internet of Things promises. The danger is that the court’s demands will pave the way to the FBI forcing Apple and others to reduce the security levels of their smart phones and computers, as well as the security of cars, medical devices, homes, and everything else that will soon be computerized.
Schneier’s piece doesn’t address the fact that we now know Apple has been hit with 12 other requests for data on various iPhone’s. If the judgment stands, dozens of requests will become hundreds. If Apple protests that this has become too much for it to deal with, the government will undoubtedly offer to perform the forensic analysis itself. Eventually, some or all of the software will likely leak or the techniques to perform the process will be reverse-engineered.

Apple’s defense against the All Writs Act will challenge all three aspects of the ruling. The company will argue that it is too far removed from the device to be required to render aid, that the request is overly burdensome, and that its help is not necessary for the FBI to conduct a criminal investigation given that data is preserved on other devices.